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Related Mediaĭata from the Handbook of National Legislatures. “ Personalist Parties in the Third Wave of Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of Peru and Bulgaria.” Politics & Policy 42: 513- 547. “ Strengthening Legislatures: Some Lessons from the Pacific Region.” Politics & Policy 41 ( 3): 420- 446. “ Toward a Theory of Personalist Parties: Concept Formation and Theory Building.” Politics & Policy 42: 490- 512.
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However, these associations are restricted to presidential systems, where the separation of powers makes legislative specialization in committees a key mechanism for effective bureaucratic oversight. Drawing on the World Bank index of bureaucratic effectiveness, this article finds significant associations between the personal vote-seeking incentive, legislative specialization, and bureaucratic effectiveness. Once legislators specialize in legislative committees, they are in a better position to increase bureaucratic effectiveness.
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In particular, I hypothesize that personal vote-seeking incentives drive legislators to specialize in legislative committees to develop their personal reputations. This article explores how electoral rules affect bureaucratic effectiveness. Literature on comparative institutions shows that electoral and constitutional rules affect the behavior of politicians, while the literature on political control of bureaucracies demonstrates how politicians exercise control over bureaucracies and affect their performance.